26th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory

Dynamic Games

Event date: June 24 - July 3, 2015

    Eric Maskin, Director (Harvard University)
    Elchanan Ben-Porath, Codirector (The Hebrew University)
    Drew Fudenberg (Harvard University)



    List of speakers:

    Robert AumannThe Hebrew Universityraumann@math.huji.ac.il
    Martin CrippsUniversity College Londonm.cripps@ucl.ac.uk
    Guillaume FréchetteNew York Universityfrechette@nyu.edu
    Drew FudenbergHarvard Universitydfudenberg@harvard.edu
    Sergiu HartThe Hebrew Universityhart@huji.ac.il
    Johannes HörnerYale Universityjohannes.horner@yale.edu
    Navin KartikColumbia Universitynkartik@gmail.com
    George MailathUniversity of Pennsylvaniagmailath@econ.upenn.edu
    Eric MaskinHarvard Universityemaskin@fas.harvard.edu
    Abraham NeymanThe Hebrew Universityaneyman@math.huji.ac.il
    Larry SamuelsonYale Universitylarry.samuelson@yale.edu
    Alistair WilsonUniversity of Pittsburghalistair@pitt.edu


    In many economic, social, and political settings, participants interact strategically not just once but over time.


    When raising its import tariffs today, for example, a country will try to anticipate the reactions of its trading partners tomorrow. And an oligopolistic firm can learn from its rivals’ past pricing behavior so as to gauge what prices they are likely to set now.


    The Summer School will emphasize theoretical aspects of dynamic games, but will also include work on experiments.


    Special thanks:

    • The Rilin Enterprises Fund at Harvard University (to Prof. Maskin)