



Stephen E. Morris
Professor of Economics
at Princeton University



Mechanism design often relies on very strong common knowledge assumptions. The lecture will describe work characterizing what happens to classic mechanism design when these common knowledge assumptions are dropped and thus there is real incomplete information..



The Arrow Lecture is part of the 28th Jerusalem Advanced School in Economic Theory held annually at the **Israel Institute for Advanced Studies**



המכון הישראלי ללימודים מתקדמים
THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM



2017 ARROW LECTURE



Mechanism Design and Incomplete Information

WEDNESDAY

JULY 5, 2017

17:30-18:30

• **Israel Institute for Advanced Studies**
• Hall 130, Feldman Building, Edmond
• J. Safra Campus, The Hebrew University
• Givat Ram, Jerusalem
• www.as.huji.ac.il