



THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM
ISRAEL INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES

28th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory on Mechanism Design

27 June - 6 July, 2017

All lectures will take place at the Israel Institute for Advanced Studies,
on the Edmond J. Safra, Givat Ram Campus Room #130

Director:

Eric Maskin (Harvard University)

Co-Directors:

Elchanan Ben-Porath (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

Stephen Morris (Princeton University)

Program

Tuesday, 27 June

- 09:00 - 10:00 Registration
- 10:00 - 10:10 Greetings
- 10:10 - 12:10 **Eric Maskin** (Harvard University)
Introduction to Mechanism Design: General Preferences
- 12:10 - 13:30 Lunch at Sherman Cafeteria
- 13:30 - 15:30 **Eric Maskin** (Harvard University)
Introduction to Mechanism Design: Quasi-linear Preferences
- 15:30 - 16:00 Coffee Break
- 16:00 - 17:30 **Ariel Rubinstein** (Tel Aviv University)
A Model of Persuasion with a Boundedly Rational Agent
- 17:30 - 19:30 Reception

Wednesday, 28 June

- 09:30 - 11:00 **Eddie Dekel** (Tel Aviv University)
Evidence in Games and Mechanism Design
- 11:00 - 11:30 Coffee Break
- 11:30 - 13:00 **Sylvain Chassang** (New York University)
Robust Dynamic Contracting
- 13:00 - 14:30 Lunch at Sherman Cafeteria

14:30 - 16:00 **Balazs Szentes** (London School of Economics)
Dynamic Contracts with Evolving Types, Part I

Thursday, 29 June

09:30 - 11:00 **Elchanan Ben-Porath** (The Hebrew University of
Jerusalem)
Mechanisms with Evidence: Robustness and
Commitment

11:00 - 11:30 Coffee Break

11:30 - 13:00 **Balazs Szentes** (London School of Economics)
Dynamic Contracts with Evolving Types, Part II

13:00 - 14:30 Lunch at Sherman Cafeteria

14:30 - 16:00 **Sylvain Chassang** (New York University)
Data-Driven Policy Design

18:00 - 20:00 Concert by Eric Maskin - held at the Jerusalem
Music Center

Friday, 30 June

09:00 - 10:30 **Emir Kamenica** (University of Chicago)
Persuasion vs. incentives

10:30 - 11:00 Coffee Break

11:00 - 12:30 **Ben Brooks** (University of Chicago)
Information design and robust predictions

12:30 - 13:30 Lunch at the IIAS Lobby

Saturday, 1 July

08:30 - 18:30 Tour to Masada and the Dead Sea

Sunday, 2 July

- 09:30 - 11:00 **Emir Kamenica** (University of Chicago)
How to represent information
- 11:00 - 11:30 Coffee Break
- 11:30 - 13:00 **Ben Brooks** (University of Chicago)
Information design meets mechanism design
- 13:00 - 14:30 Lunch at Sherman Cafeteria
- 14:30 - 16:00 **Vasiliki Skerta**
Two lectures on Informed Principal, Part A

Monday, 3 July

- 09:30 - 11:00 **Stephen Morris** (Princeton University)
Informationally Robust Mechanism Design, I
- 11:00 - 11:30 Coffee Break
- 11:30 - 13:00 **Sergiu Hart** (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Two(!) Good To Be True
- 13:00 - 14:30 Lunch at Sherman Cafeteria
- 14:30 - 16:00 **Vasiliki Skerta**
Two lectures on Informed Principal, Part B

Tuesday, 4 July

- 09:30 - 11:00 **Stephen Morris** (Princeton University)
Informationally Robust Mechanism Design, II
- 11:00 - 11:30 Coffee Break
- 11:30 - 13:00 **Jakub Kastl** (Princeton University)
Empirical Analysis of Multiunit Auctions

13:00 - 14:00 Lunch at IIAS Lobby

14:00 - 18:00 Tour to the Old City

Wednesday, 5 July

09:30 - 11:00 **Jakub Kastl** (Princeton University)
Empirical Analysis of Education Markets

11:00 - 11:30 Coffee Break

11:30 - 13:00 **Tim Roughgarden** (Stanford University)
The Price of Anarchy and Equilibrium Welfare
Guarantees for Simple
Auctions

13:00 - 14:30 Lunch at Sherman Cafeteria

14:30 - 16:15 Poster Session

16:15 - 17:30 **Kenneth Arrow Commemoration Event**

17:30 - 18:30 **Stephen Morris** (Princeton University)
Arrow lecture:
Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information

19:00 - 20:30 Dinner

Thursday, 6 July

09:30 - 11:00 **Tim Roughgarden** (Stanford University)
Communication Complexity and Impossibility
Results for Simple Auctions

11:00 - 11:30 Coffee Break

11:30 - 13:00 **Jason Hartline** (Northwestern University)
Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design and
Approximation. Part I, multi - agent
mechanisms

13:00 - 14:30 Lunch at Sherman Cafeteria

14:30 - 16:00 **Jason Hartline** (Northwestern University)
Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design and
Approximation. Part II, single - agent
mechanisms